AI agent identity and authorization

Agents now make up a growing share of API traffic, and the tools most services have for reasoning about them are an API key and a user agent string. A key says nothing about who operates the agent, what it may do, or whether that permission still holds. So you end up choosing between blocking all automation and trusting all of it.

01

Agent traffic becomes attributable to a named operator

02

Scopes and expiry enforced by the credential, not by a table somebody forgot to update

03

Revoking a compromised agent is one revocation, not a key rotation everywhere

How is this different from an API key?

A key is a shared secret with no meaning attached. Whoever holds it is the agent. A credential is signed by an issuer, names the responsible organisation, carries scopes and an expiry, and can be revoked centrally and checked by anyone.

Do we need a relationship with the agent operator?

No, and that is the useful part. Verification runs against the issuer signature and trust list, so you can admit an agent you have never seen on the basis of who vouched for it.

Does this relate to the EU AI Act?

The Act pushes toward transparency about when a system is automated and who is accountable. Attributable agent identity is a practical way to do that, though the Act does not require this specific approach.

Built on Authbound Credential Issuance. One API key covers every flow you add later.